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**AMERICA'S ARMY AND THE FUTURE OF
MILITARY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
OPTIONS FOR THE ARMY RESERVE**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL (P) MALCOLM B. WESTCOTT
United States Army Reserve**

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**America's Army and
The Future Of Military Peacekeeping Operations:
Options For The Army Reserve**

by

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Malcolm B. Westcott
United States Army Reserve

Colonel Joseph R. Cerami
Project Advisor

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

Author: Malcolm B. Westcott, LTC(P), MSC

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Since the end of the cold war, the US military has become increasingly involved in a number of peacekeeping operations including Lebanon, 1982-1984; Panama, 1989; Bangladesh, 1991; Kuwait, 1991; Somalia, 1992-1994; and the current Bosnia Operation. Whether the US military possesses the capabilities to operate effectively in peace operations, while maintaining the capability to successfully respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), is of vital concern to military strategic planners. This paper will explore the impacts of peacekeeping operations on US Army readiness and force structure. It will suggest options for using Army Reserve Forces and for increasing force flexibility and response capability.

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B. Westcott

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Introduction

Purpose:

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) is evolving to reflect the emerging world order. Cold war strategy, dominated by the importance of containing communism, established nuclear and conventional deterrence as the primary military mission. The Soviet threat dominated strategy, doctrine, operational planning, and funding. The Army focused on forward deployed forces in Europe and Northeast Asia and on the ability to rapidly reinforce the operational theater with Continental United States (CONUS) based Active and Reserve forces.

The current national security landscape has changed radically. A single Soviet threat no longer dominates planning. The current NSS still requires the forces necessary to fight and win two major regional conflicts, but our attention is increasingly occupied with smaller peacekeeping operational requirements. Instead of focusing on containment and deterrence, we now emphasize global democracy, free trade, and economic advancement for the entire world.

America's Army again faces the great dilemma of how to structure itself in an interwar (peace) period. The Army's challenge this time is to avoid the pitfalls of the past century. As an institution, we must avoid a recurrence of the "Task Force Smith Syndrome." We cannot allow the devastating loss of life associated with a military strategy so underfunded that it cannot be executed.

America currently faces significant technological, economic, political, and social challenges in the national security environment. Present trade and budget deficits will most certainly jeopardize our ability to fund the forces required to execute the present strategy.

The military component of this strategy requires both the ability to fight and win regional wars and conduct the full range of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Balancing structure and preparedness for these two divergent operations is our greatest challenge.

To carry out the strategy of engagement and enlargement, the U.S. military has become increasingly involved in a number of peacekeeping operations: Lebanon, 1982-1984; Panama, 1989; Bangladesh, 1991; Kuwait, 1991; Somalia, 1992-1994; and the current Bosnia Operation, just to name a few. (See Table 15.0, Appendix E)

Whether the U.S. military possesses the capabilities necessary to operate effectively in peace operations, while maintaining the capability to successfully respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), is of vital concern to military strategic planners.

This paper will explore the impacts of peacekeeping operations on US Army readiness and force structure. It will suggest several concepts for increasing force flexibility and response capability. Specifically, the research will focus on using the U.S. Army Reserve capabilities to mitigate the adverse effects of military peacekeeping operations on America's Army.

Military Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Background:

The President's National Security Strategy is crystal clear about peace operations: "We must prepare our forces for peace operations... in some cases their use will be necessary or desirable and justified by US national interests."¹

The central purpose of peace operations is to prevent, halt, or contain conflict. These operations require combat-ready, military forces sufficient to accomplish the mission. Peace operations share characteristics with both warfighting and other MOOTW.

MOOTW are a vital part of the National Security Strategy. We must not underestimate the difficulty of these efforts. In the words of Steven Stedman:

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the difficulty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either to succeed, policy makers must spell out their interests, set priorities among cases, and balance goals with resources. The President will still need to educate the American people about the rationale behind a policy and convince them of the need for action. Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.²

Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW):

Current MOOTW doctrine as defined in FM 100-5, Operations, lists the specific missions in Table 1.0 as MOOTW. Participants in such operations may feel like they are fighting a war. Viewed from a national perspective, MOOTW are ostensibly low-risk or short duration affairs in which U.S. forces operate under tight rules of engagement for limited aims: defense of economic order, preservation of U.S. political influence, support of

international order, and unilateral actions supporting U.S. interests. These are in line with the aims of America's strategy of engagement. MOOTW missions provide ready military ways for executing that strategy.³

Table 1.0: Types of Operations Classified as MOOTW

• Noncombatant evacuation operations	• Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, show of force
• Arms control	• Support for insurgencies and counter insurgencies
• Support to domestic civil authorities	• Raids and strikes
• Humanitarian assistance	• Sanction enforcement
• Security assistance	• Enforcing exclusion zones
• National assistance	• Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight
• Counterdrug operations	• Protection of shipping
• Counterterrorism	• Recovery operations

MOOTW include, but are not limited to all of the above.

Source: FM 100-5, Operations, Chapter 13, p.5.

Military planners have used the term peacekeeping since World War II without official definition. However, the recent increase in peacekeeping operations and renewed interest in this type of operation have prompted an official UN definition of the term:

An operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in an area of conflict.⁴

The International Peace Academy (American, British, Canadian, and Australian [ABCA] Armies Combat Development Guide 2010) offers a more comprehensive definition:

Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore the peace.⁵

So in its simplest form peacekeeping is the conduct of non-combat military operations (except for self defense) by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties involved in a conflict or impending conflict in order to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement. Further, it should support diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive peace settlement.

Peacekeeping Resources:

The force structure recommended in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), has been approved by President Clinton. It is specifically designed to accomplish the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.⁶ The Clinton administration has pledged to provide sufficient funding for this force structure:

At the President's direction, the Pentagon completed the Bottom-Up Review, a full-scale assessment of what defense forces and systems our nation needs for this new security era. The President has also set forth a defense budget for Fiscal Years 1996-2001 that funds the force structure recommended by the Review, and he repeatedly stressed that he will draw the line against further cuts that would undermine that force structure or erode US military readiness.⁷

The Bottom-up Review did in fact recommend sufficient force structure for the strategy of engagement. However, the US defense budget has not provided enough funds to both support and modernize this force.

Mission requirements flowing from the National Security Strategy and the BUR were built on logic and are a valid basis for estimating current and future resources required to field the forces necessary to execute the strategy. Here is where the problem arises. As we all now know there is widespread agreement that the force requirements of the Clinton administration defense program exceed its projected defense budgets. Although there is substantial disagreement over the actual amount of underfunding, the January 1995 GAO reports says it could be as high as 150 billion dollars!⁸

Costs and funding for MOOTW, Peace Operations:

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State are the two lead agencies committed to MOOTW. Other federal agencies involved in peace operations are the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, and Health and Human Services.

The costs of most agencies' and departments' participation in peace operations are paid from their congressional appropriations. These costs include expenditures for direct participation of US military forces, the United States share of UN peacekeeping assessment, and humanitarian assistance. Federal agencies' and departments' participation in peace operations has been estimated to cost \$3.7 billion during fiscal year 1995; \$672 million of this estimated cost has not been funded (final FY 1995 figures are not yet available). These estimated costs will increase if the need for new operations arises or current operations are expanded.⁹

DOD estimates its share of these costs to be about \$1.8 billion, or 49% of the total cost of 1995 peace operations. These incremental costs include (1) special payments: including imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and foreign duty pay for troops deployed to certain peace operations; (2) operation and maintenance expenses in support of deployed forces; and (3) procurement of special mission items. Incremental costs are defined by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) as costs that would not have been incurred except for the operation.¹⁰

DOD's annual budget provides the capability to conduct peace operations, but it does not fund incremental costs. This is where the friction begins regarding the true costs of peace operations. As a means of determining how funds are spent,

programs can be divided into "investment" and "support" categories. Investment programs fund the procurement of defense capital goods, such as weapons systems, equipment, and facilities; support programs fund the operation and maintenance of defense forces and equipment.

The current Army budget dilemma is best illustrated by (former Army Chief of Staff) General Sullivan's statement before Congress:

The budget before you will keep the Army trained and ready in 1996 Sustaining a quality force in fiscal year 1996 within the Army's dollar constraints requires Army leaders to make difficult choices between operational readiness and a needed investment in modernization and future readiness.¹¹

The Army is, in fact, mortgaging its future by paying our current bills with future procurement dollars. Unresourced MOOTW operations only exacerbate the problem.

As a current example of this dilemma, let us briefly examine the 1996 military personnel authorization (MPA), which projects a \$400 million dollar shortfall. This is the third consecutive year that the Active Army MPA account has been underfunded. Army Chief of Staff General Reimer is faced with serious management decisions in the near term, specifically:

The \$400 million shortfall is expected to impact thousands of soldiers. About 3,000 promotions to specialists are on hold, soldiers could be forced to leave service early when their service term expires, others could be offered voluntary early separation, reenlistment bonuses are being cut and fewer recruits are being brought on Active Duty. In September hundreds of officers were offered early outs in an expanded 1996 drawdown.¹²

All of this, along with a \$2.0 billion Bosnia operation, presents a very sobering picture. At the very time America's Army readiness needs to be at its highest, the budget looms like a menacing monster on the horizon. With no clear, immediate


budget relief, the Army will be pressured to continue the personnel drawdown to a force below 495,000. Further, it will remain under-equipped and unmodernized for the foreseeable future.

Readiness Implications:

Many recent reports have dealt with the effects of MOOTW operations on unit combat readiness. Some have questioned the ability of a unit engaged in MOOTW operations to react to a "no notice" MRC deployment. Many factors influence the time it takes for an Army unit to return to normal combat readiness. After a MOOTW deployment the literature agrees that a period of four to six months represents the normal time span for recovery of unit readiness. Once committed to a MOOTW operation, the generic Army "unit" would not be fully combat ready for several months after their return to home station (See timeline in Table 2.O, below). The principal limiting factors are maintenance, availability of training, and substantial personnel turbulence. Light infantry and other units with very little equipment will recover fastest. Vehicle intensive units that deploy their own equipment can be expected to take the longest. Many units are deployed to perform tasks that are not related to their wartime Mission Essential Task List (METL) at all (for example, an artillery unit that is deployed to provide truck drivers and 'filler' soldiers for other units). These units may also need more time to return to normal readiness.¹³

Table 2.0:

Return to Readiness Timeline



Source: CALL Interim Report, 1995, "Effects of PKO on Unit Readiness"

The Phases:

Light infantry, mechanized, armored, combat support, and combat services support units all have different requirements and will require different amounts of time to restore normal combat readiness. The conditions of the specific peace operations will also affect the return-to-readiness time required. Notwithstanding these differences, all units go through common phases while returning to normal combat readiness: Initial Recovery (1-2 weeks), Block Leave (2 weeks), Maintenance (1-6 weeks), Personnel Restructuring (3 months), Individual Training (4-6 weeks), Collective Training (2-10 weeks), and Transportation of Equipment (1-6+ months).¹⁴

Combat Service Support (CSS) Units Requirements:

CSS units present a unique problem in that they vary significantly in equipment density and mission. Normally, these units will perform their wartime mission, under similar

conditions, in either a peace operation or an MRC. This helps CSS soldiers sustain their MOS skills during the peace operation; it also minimizes required collective training. The biggest issues for CSS units are the condition of the unit equipment and the amount on hand. Many key pieces of equipment are also only "one-deep," making their maintenance even more important. Further, most CSS units will be involved in the reconstitution of their normal customer units, so they will have additional problems reconstituting themselves during the same period.¹⁵

Active Army CS/CSS Structure Issues:

Sustaining large-scale peacekeeping operations for extended periods of time requires specific types of Active Army support forces to establish infrastructure in what is often a very austere environment. Support forces provide necessities (food, water, toilets, showers, medical attention) to U.S. military forces, coalition forces and the local population. If nation-building is part of the military mission, support force requirements increase even further. Nation-building requires the military to build bridges, schools, and hospitals; it also provides police and other civil administration.¹⁶

The Army's combat support forces (CS) (such as military police) and combat service support (CSS) (such as port handlers and quartermaster personnel) provide these important services. However, many of these CS/CSS units are in the Reserve Component. For various military and political reasons, these needed Reserve units have not been requested and consequently not activated in sufficient densities to support recent peacekeeping operations. A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, prior to **Joint Endeavor**, the current Bosnia operation, provides these insights:

The Army's capacity for providing unique support capabilities exceeds that of any other military service or nation. Yet, most of these support capabilities are in the

Reserves and, except for volunteers, the Army has been authorized to draw on Reserves for peace operations only once . . . in September 1994 for the operation in Haiti. Without a presidential decision to call up Reserve forces, the Army has had to draw upon the smaller number of active forces and Reserve volunteers to meet support requirements. In some cases, nearly all the active units for a particular support capability deployed to a peace operation. In fact, 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies in the active force structure deployed to Somalia. Similarly, 67 percent of the medium petroleum truck companies and 100 percent of the air terminal movement control teams deployed to Somalia.¹⁷

To graphically display the scope of the Somalia problem, Table 3.0 (below) provides a list of selected Army capabilities within quartermaster, transportation, engineering, and miscellaneous support units that experienced heavy deployments to Somalia.

Table 3.0: Selected Army Support Units that Experienced Heavy Deployments to Somalia.

Type of unit	Number of active units	Number deployed to Somalia	Percentage of active units deployed to Somalia
General supply company	4	4	100
Air terminal movement control detachment	1	1	100
Petroleum supply company	4	3	75
Medium truck company (petroleum)	3	2	67
Cargo transfer company	3	2	67
Light-medium truck company	10	6	60
Fire-fighting truck detachment	7	4	57
Water purification ROWPU detachment	4	2	50
Perishable Subsistence Team	2	1	50

Source: Army Command & Control Agency, Department of the Army

Today in Bosnia more than 72 units and 3000 reserve personnel have been alerted and deployed in support of operation ***Joint Endeavor***. This reserve deployment was accomplished by using a PSRC authority.

The stress of peace operations on the Army has been heightened by the practice of cross-leveling. This practice maintains support units at about 10 to 20 percent below their authorized manning levels during peacetime; it depends on quickly increasing the unit to full strength at deployment.¹⁸ This is accomplished by borrowing individual personnel from units that are not scheduled to deploy. This practice, combined with the Army's recent down-sizing (See Table 17.O, Appendix G) has placed considerable stress on CS/CSS units to deploy and operate at full wartime capability.

The Army's experience in Somalia illustrates the challenges that lie ahead when the United States chooses to deploy forces to global peace operations without the use of Reserve force CS/CSS capabilities.

A March 1995 GAO Report reviewing the Active Army CS/CSS units that deployed to Somalia summarized the "Cross-Leveling" problem:

After the Army restructured its forces in the mid-1980's, we reported that its goal was to authorize combat units, which are the chief means of deterrence, to be staffed at 100 percent of their wartime requirements and support units to be staffed at an average of 90 percent of their wartime requirements. In discussions with XVIIIth Airborne Corps officials, the most ready and resourced of all the Army Corps, we were advised that support units deploying to Somalia needed 100 percent or more of their authorized people and equipment in order to meet operational requirements. Most units did not have the people, and many did not have the equipment to satisfy this requirement. Almost half of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps' First Corps Support Command units were authorized 90 percent or less of their authorized people, and several support units were

authorized 80 percent or less of their authorized people. Other corps support commands, such as the Third Corps, which provided initial corps support for operations in Somalia, are resourced at an even lower level than the XVIII¹⁹ Airborne Corps.

The Army, recognizing current budget realities, prioritized scarce active personnel resources to the divisions and then to follow-on CS/CSS units. They postulated that if the early-deploying active support units were needed for war or MOOTW operations, they could be rapidly reinforced with Reserve Forces.

Findings and Interpretations

The BUR force is being used on a daily and increasing basis for MOOTW, specifically for peacekeeping and enforcement operations. These operations validate the Army's relevancy; they represent our nation's will and its capability to engage in world affairs. Based on their inherent characteristics and on recent operational experience, Active Army support forces are not designed, manned, or numerous enough to accomplish MOOTW missions and also to be available for their primary mission of warfighting.²⁰ Further, contrary to the BUR's assumptions, it will be very difficult to disengage deployed support units from a peace operation and redeploy them as ready combat units to a MRC in accordance with established time phased deployment timelines.

If the current trends continue, the Army's primary future operational mission will be that of extended MOOTW operations. Thus our force must be shaped, structured, and resourced to support MOOTW as a likely primary mission, not a secondary or "ad hoc" effort.

The Military Operations Continuum considers peace as the normal condition between nation-states. FM 100-5 Operations,

displays the continuum as three states: war, conflict, and peace. MOOTW missions reside in both the conflict and peacetime conditions. The Army's primary mission in the wartime condition is clearly, "Fight and Win." The wartime scenarios are by far more risky and force intensive; however, they are the least likely scenarios envisioned for the emerging 21st Century. The most likely future engagements for America's Army, in the near future are MOOTW missions, conducted across the full spectrum of PKO.

Further, I do not envision future defense budgets allocating more money to address current Army funding issues (let alone the ones we have failed to identify). The Army's force structure must be robust enough to sustain expected levels of MOOTW operations without paralyzing our first response forces for a Major Regional Contingency. Secondly, to accomplish this transformation, the force structure, roles, missions and resourcing between the Active Army and Army Reserve forces must be realistic and free from parochialism. America does not need, nor can she afford, three separate Armies: one for regional warfighting, another separate force for MOOTW operations, and yet a third for state domestic problems.

Recommendations:

If the United States wants to continue participating in sizable peace operations for extended periods and to maintain the capability to respond rapidly to two nearly simultaneous MRC, it must make hard choices involving the use of resources and the degree of military and political risk it is prepared to take.

The following recommendations suggest several solutions to some of the Army's more immediate problems with MOOTW operations. They are not designed to provide all-inclusive answers. Rather, they suggest possible and plausible courses of action that warrant further investigation.

Change the Mix of Active/Reserve Support Forces:

The time has come to review the type, quantity, location, and manning levels of Army CS/CSS units and determine the best possible force mix, irrespective of inter-component rivalry and competition.²¹ One option would increase the availability of support forces for peace operations by maintaining fewer combat and more support forces on active duty. In an attempt to save Active Component division strength, the Army has placed many CS/CSS unit requirements in the Reserve Component. Now many of those same CS/CSS units in the Reserve Component are required for active peacekeeping operations.

More support forces could be made available for peacekeeping operations (PKO) if the Army maintained fewer active combat forces and redirected those active resources to maintain more CS/CSS units. This restructuring could be implemented during the Army's normal Total Army Analysis Process.

Further, the Active Army should maintain a capability to be self-supporting for peacekeeping brigade-size operations of less than 75 days. Operations planned for a duration in excess of 75 days should routinely include a request for a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) for timely access to the Reserve Component. Gaining access to Reserve Component personnel without their consent via the authority of a PSRC is a very sensitive political matter. It has the potential to disrupt the lives of the reserve members, their families, and their employers. PSRC authority should be used only after careful planning and when deemed absolutely necessary for PKO operations. PKO comprise a wide variety of missions and operations. The status in which Reserve Forces are accessed for these operations (voluntary or involuntary [PSRC]) should depend on a variety of military considerations: nature, size, planned duration, reserve capabilities required, other on-going operations, just to name a few. The challenge is the prudent use, not over use, of the

Reserve Component and PSRC authority. The 75-day, brigade-size operation baseline makes good sense as a planning consideration. It should not be construed as an absolute; rather it should be viewed as prudent planning.

Access to the Army Reserve:


The current Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 98-03 is very specific concerning the accessibility of the Reserve Component. Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) or partial mobilization will be assumed for accessing RC units and individuals. It should also be noted that no president has ever denied a request from a SECDEF for a PSRC. Recent operations in Haiti and Bosnia should serve as models for the integrated use of the Reserve Component.

Current law (Title 10 of the US code, section 12304, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-UP [PSRC]) allows access to 200,000 members of the selected Reserve for 270 days. (See Table 16.0, Appendix F, for all Title 10 USC mobilization statutes.) The president is only required to notify Congress that he is making a call-up.²² If the MOOTW/peacekeeping mission is important enough to the national interests of this country to send Active Component Forces, a PSRC is not only militarily essential; it is mandatory as a demonstration of American resolve and solidarity. The unifying effect of a Reserve call-up cannot be overstated.

The concept of requesting PSRC authority must be institutionalized by the Army and planned for at all military levels. The following model represents a method that could be implemented as planning guidance. This model would ensure adequate CS/CSS support for PKO operations in excess of 75 days, while safeguarding our force readiness for a "no notice" MRC.

Table 4.0:

Planned Level of Response



Potential New Support Missions for the Army Reserve:

Today's Army Reserve has proven itself to be a successful and essential partner in America's Army. The Active Army must plan for and embrace the concept of increased use of the Army Reserve's unique CS/CSS capabilities and individual skills for use in contingencies as well as the full range of MOOTW operations. The Army Reserve's strength and expertise are even more critical to the Army's success in today's resource constrained environment.

U.S. Army Reserve Support Concepts:

The dawn of the 21st Century is now seeing the total integration of the U.S. Army Reserve into America's Army. Operation **Desert Storm** proved the concept does work. Army resources have been reduced by 34% since 1989. Obviously we cannot continue to do "business as usual." We must reengineer the way we do business. In the words of former Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivan, "ask the unaskable; think

the unthinkable; find ***new*** ways; not just better ways." The following USAR concepts are just that, "new ways" to solve old problems.

A. Reserve Associate Support Program (RASP) :

The USAR has developed a concept which provides ready access to a specified number of USAR personnel without the requirement of a PSRC. The design ensures that trained and ready soldiers support Active Army operations for operations of less than 75 days. The plan has several key elements:


(1) The establishment of Reserve Associate Support Program Units (RASP), composed of selected CS and CSS trained soldiers, complementary to expected active contingency and MOOTW unit CS/CSS requirements. These USAR RASP Units would be co-located with, train with, and as needed, deploy with selected associate active units. In some cases, these units would be that structural part of the "host" active unit needed to bring it to Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 1 (Full Wartime Manning), thus avoiding the current practice of active cross-leveling and all associated problems.

(2) Soldiers assigned to these units would be serving as USAR personnel, on Active Duty, in an Active Duty for Training (ADT) status. During this period of ADT service the USAR soldiers would, for all practical purposes, be totally accessible for deployment operations in support of active units without a PSRC. This period of Active Duty, acknowledged by the soldiers prior to enlistment or assignment to these units, would be for their Initial Entry Training (IET) plus 12 to 18 months of on the job training in the ADT status. Essential RASP unit leadership and permanent party requirements would be resourced as Active Guard Reserve (AGR) positions.

(3) Personnel after completing their on the job training in these RASP units would be separated from the active associate unit program and returned to fill (and initially be procured against) the known and projected vacancies of USAR's Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units and the newer requirements of the emerging Force Support Package (FSP) concept. This will preserve their active training experience and infuse it in the early deploying CFP/FSP units. Personnel procurement policies will provide sufficient overlap to ensure full deployability of the associate unit at all times.

(4) A force structure of about 5,000 USAR spaces would be used to resource the pilot program. The program can be executed within or in addition to the USAR Force Structure Authorization and End Strength (FSA/ES).

Table 5.0:



B. Individual Volunteer Unit:

Currently, the Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentees (DIMA) program levels in the USAR are being reduced. Both the IMA and DIMA program provide essential USAR individual personnel support to active

Joint and Army headquarters, at all levels. These USAR individual filler personnel allow the active headquarters to expand from peacetime operations to the required 24 hour per day continuous wartime operations. The drawdown of the USAR endstrength to 208,000 along with higher priority structure requirements have limited the USAR's ability to field these required IMA/DIMA positions.


Further, historically, the non-accessibility of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (see Table 16.0, Appendix F) during a PSRC mobilization, has presented individual manning problems and the cross-leveling phenomenon.

The solution to both issues resides in the creation of an Individual Volunteer Unit (IVU). The IVU, a personnel management holding company account, will allow the transparent movement of personnel between the IRR and the Selected Reserve (SELRES) IMA/DIMA accounts thus greatly improving the accessibility to both SELRES and IRR soldiers. Through the technique of "Battle Rostering," the IVU will manage and provide a ready pool of USAR volunteers of the right skill to the activating or deploying force, either at PSRC or Partial Mobilization. Personnel will flow from the IRR to the SELRES as needed for the mission requirement-whether it be a standard two-week Annual Training (AT) period or a deployment to a MOOTW.

Acceptance of an IMA or DIMA position has always been voluntary in nature. Under this concept, individuals would continue in their volunteer status; however, they would normally reside in the IRR and only transition to the SELRES, when they were needed. Depending upon the mission requirements, duration, and their stated participation desires, individuals could volunteer for the assignment. Once an individual enters a higher level of participation, accountability for that soldier moves from the IRR to SELRES. This is accomplished by reassignment

within the IVU from an inactive "required" IRR position to an active "authorized" SELRES position.

Table 6.0:



The IVU will provide a flexible option and management tool to both preserve the IMA/DIMA populations and provide the needed IRR individual support for America's Army. It will do this while preserving the USAR TOE end strength and improving accessibility to USAR individual soldiers. The IVU concept provides a vehicle for USAR individual personnel support throughout the Mobilization Continuum.

C. Army Reserve Tiered Readiness Concept:


The Army Reserve has instituted a number of initiatives for managing scarce resources. These initiatives insure that the units and individuals most required early in the warfight get the resources and services they need to maintain readiness.

Army Reserve units that have benefited the most so far are those that are part of the Army's Force Support Package (FSP) concept formerly called Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units. (See Table 13 and 14, Appendix C.) These are the combat support and combat service support units that have been identified as support for the Contingency Response Force and Early Reinforcing Force units, in the case of a contingency. They include approximately 355 transportation, medical, civil affairs, signal, engineer, and maintenance units that the Army needs to meet contingency mission requirements.

FSP units receive the highest priority for recruiting, training and equipping. As a group, their readiness has increased 28 percent since 1992 as a result of the U.S. Army Reserve Command's (USARC) successful implementation of the Tiered Readiness Concept.

The concept for prioritizing and managing Army Reserve resources is called tiered readiness. Army Reserve units are organized into five tiers. These are based on deployment dates in support of regional operations plans in descending order from one through five. Units are color coded as follows: Green units in Tier I are the highest priority and are resourced to maintain C2 or better. Green units in Tier II are follow-on forces and are resourced to maintain a readiness profile of C3 or better. Yellow units in Tier II and III are resourced to maintain a 70% mission capable status and are, for the most, part non-deploying TDA TRADOC training base expansion units or peacetime IET production units. Red units are resourced at 50% mission capable status and are inactivating units or non-deployable TDA structure.

Table 7.0 USAR Tiered Readiness Program.



D. Force Structure:

As a federal, Title 10 organization, the Army Reserve's first responsibility is to the needs of America's Army. The Army Reserve's structure, strength and missions are tailored to make maximum use of its ability to provide combat support and combat service support units and/or personnel on short notice to the Active Army wherever they are ordered.

Numerous changes to the Army Reserve's force structure are under way to meet the Army's changing requirements. As America's Army restructures, many more combat support and combat service support functions are migrating to the Army Reserve. Because the

Army Reserve is already focused on CS/CSS competencies, we are in a solid position to provide CS/CSS for the Army in training and operational situations. Many of the skills that are in short supply in the Active Army are ones that are practiced over the years by our citizen-soldiers in their civilian occupations.

The types of units that comprise the majority of the Army Reserve's structure are those most able to maintain training and readiness within the constraints of Reserve training time and funds. At the same time, these CS/CSS units are vital to the success of any significant deployment.²³

Table 8.0:

**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARMY**

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>Army National Guard Number Units</u>	<u>Army Reserve Number Units</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Training Divisions	0	9	100%
Chemical Brigades	1	3	100%
Water Supply Battalions	2	3	100%
Enemy Prison of War Brigades	0	1	100%
Judge Advocate General Units	4	155	100%
Public Affairs Units	48	28	100%
Theater Defense Brigades	3	0	100%
Roundout/Roundup Brigades	7	0	100%
Civil Affairs Units	0	37	97%
Petroleum Support Battalions	6	6	86%
Medical Brigades	3	10	86%
Chemical Battalions	2	8	77%
Training Brigades	0	3	83%
Motor Battalions	6	11	77%
Maintenance Battalions	11	5	73%
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	14	15	76%
Psychological Operations Units	0	33	75%
Hospitals	24	47	85^
Medical Groups	3	9	71%
Separate Brigades	9	1	67%
Petroleum Groups	0	1	67%
Corps Support Groups	4	5	58%
Field Artillery Battalions	88	7	62%

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>Army National Guard Number Units</u>	<u>Army Reserve Number Units</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	39	10	63%
Terminal Battalions	0	4	57%
Military Police Battalions	12	19	72%
Military Police Brigades	3	2	56%
Medium Helicopter Battalions	3	2	55%
Infantry Divisions	2	0	50%
Corps Support Commands	1	1	50%
Light Infantry Divisions	1	0	33%
Area Support Groups	9	3	44%
Attack Helicopter Battalions	21	3	48%
Aviation Brigades	10	6	43%
Special Forces Groups	2	0	22%
Ordnance Battalions	0	5	42%
Armor Divisions	1	0	33%
Theater Army Area Commands	0	2	40%
Signal Battalions	30	5	40%
Air Assault Battalions	2	5	39%
Infantry Divisions (Mech)	4	0	38%
Military Intelligence Battalions	7	13	37%
Armored Cavalry Regiments	1	0	33%
Air Defense Brigades	3	0	33%
Air Defense Battalions (Topographical)	1	0	25%

COMMAND AND CONTROL:

The most significant of the USAR's reengineering concepts is the USARC reorganization of its command and control headquarters structure. This reorganization will replace the present Cold War structure of 20 U.S. based Army Reserve Commands, (ARCOMS) with 10 Regional Support Commands (RSC), reporting directly to Headquarters, USARC.

Also included in this reorganization is the implementation of a new structure called a Garrison Support Unit to assist in the management of Active Component garrisons during mobilization. Their new mission is to backfill Active Army Base Operations capabilities lost by deploying active component organizations during contingency or MOOTW operations. They will also provide peacetime support to their host installations.

The Command and Control reorganization will focus the Army Reserve on its readiness and training missions, reduce redundancy, assist in reaching lower end-strength goals and improve our capability to deploy units and support mobilization.²⁴

Conclusions:

America's Army must be shaped to support MOOTW operations. It must also maintain the capability to fight and win a single major regional conflict. This future force must balance both capabilities within projected fiscal constraints, while still modernizing and sustaining warfighting readiness. The Army Reserve must be a full partner in this endeavor. This is a critical internal Army problem. Because we live in an era of diminishing resources, further force reductions are inevitable. As an institution, we can no longer draw a line in the sand, defending a ten division Active Army. We must embrace the fact that our future relevancy lies in MOOTW operations. The traditional warrior ethic must be balanced against the reality of the emerging twenty-first century peacekeeping mission. We must no longer be divided over the issue of warfighting versus MOOTW. If we do not address this issue, our future course is predetermined; further drawdown, personnel turbulence and dissatisfaction, an ongoing struggle to somehow balance an ever-shrinking defense budget. The future challenge is great, but we can accomplish the mission. Failure to meet the challenge simply means unacceptable security risks and diminished American global influence.

APPENDIX A

National Security Strategy (NSS):

The end of the Cold War has further tightened the close, necessary complementary relationship between military activities and other elements of US National power. The President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a broad range of threats to our country, our allies, and our geostrategic National interests. The more that democracy, political and economic liberalization take hold in the new world order, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more prosperous our people.

To that end, the central components of the strategy of engagement and enlargement are:

Efforts to enhance US security by maintaining a strong defense capacity and by promoting cooperative regional security. This includes the ability, in concert with our regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Also the strategy calls for continued pursuit of arms control and limitations on weapons of mass destruction.

US initiatives seek to open foreign markets, stimulate global economic growth and promote world democracy. We seek to establish a framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies.²⁵

National Military Strategy (NMS):

The National Security Strategy defines our security objectives and provides the necessary strategic guidance to formulate the National Military Strategy.


In its most simple construct, it anticipates three sets of military tasks: remaining constructively engaged in peacetime; acting to deter aggression and prevent conflict; and fighting and winning our Nations wars when called upon.²⁶

Our military, in combination with other elements of national power, must be trained and prepared to address four principal dangers: regional instability, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers, and dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.²⁷

To address these dangers, US military strategy must be intrinsically constructive, proactive, and preventive, thereby

reducing the sources of conflict and at the same time blocking the effective use of force by potential adversaries. In military terms we have translated these purposes into two complementary objectives: promoting stability and thwarting aggression.²⁸

Table 9.0 Achieving National Military Objectives



Both the NSS and NMS were greatly influenced by the conclusions of the 1993 report entitled "The Bottom Up Review (BUR)." This report has evolved as America's Strategic "cornerstone." It serves as the basis for both our National Security Strategy and our National Military Strategy. For that reason, the next section will thoroughly analyze the thought processes used in developing the BUR.

APPENDIX B

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR):

The BUR was an assessment of the US force requirements following the dissipation of the Soviet Threat. The assessment concluded that the United States should maintain sufficient ground, sea, and air forces to win in two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.²⁹

The BUR recognized that US military forces and support assets will be called upon to perform a wide range of missions in the future. These missions include deterring nuclear attack, fighting and winning regional wars, conducting peace operations and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, both at home and abroad. For force planning purposes, the BUR took account of the need to provide forces for the following major types of operations:

- 1) Fighting and winning major regional conflicts
- 2) Overseas presence - Providing US Forces (both stationed and deployed) in selected areas overseas in peacetime
- 3) Smaller-scale conflicts or crises that would require US forces to conduct peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and other more limited uses of force.
- 4) Deterring and preventing the effective use of weapons of mass destruction³⁰

During the BUR, the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) analyzed the full range of possible future missions to determine what types of forces would be needed to meet US objectives. Analysis to support force sizing focused heavily (though not exclusively) on major conflicts in Southwest Asia and Korea as two possible, stressing cases to test the adequacy of the levels and mixes of US military forces. In both cases, intelligence estimates of the future capabilities of potential US adversaries and allies were used to construct the scenarios used in the analysis. Consideration of the requirements for overseas presence, peace and humanitarian operations also helped determine the aggregate size, types and mix of forces needed to carry out the strategy.³¹ The force structure that emerged from the Bottom-Up Review and that has been approved by President Clinton is shown below. This force is intended to support operations in two nearly simultaneous MRCs by drawing on Active Duty and readily available Reserve Component units. This force can, under normal conditions, support participation by US forces in peacekeeping and peace enforcement

operations. However, the BUR force structure cannot, and was never intended to, support such operations during the rare instances when it might be called upon to fight large-scale wars in two separate regions at the same time.³²

Table 10.0: Bottom-Up Review, US Force Structure 1999

ARMY	10 divisions (Active) 37 National Guard Brigades (15 with enhanced readiness)
NAVY	11 aircraft carriers (Active) 1 Reserve/training carrier 45-55 attack submarines 346 ships
AIR FORCE	13 fighter wings (Active) 7 fighter wings (Reserve) Up to 184 Bombers
MARINE CORPS	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 174,000 personnel (Active endstrength) 42,000 personnel (Reserve endstrength)
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES (by 2003)	18 ballistic missile submarines Up to 94 B-52H bombers 20 B-2 bombers 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)

Source: BUR, Oct 1993

Determining Army Force Structure:

To determine Army force levels, the Bottom-Up Review examined a series of options for Active Army forces; eight divisions, ten divisions, and twelve divisions. Careful analysis of potential future conflicts led both OSD and the Joint Staff to the following conclusions regarding Army force structure:

Table 11.0: Army Force Options for Major Regional Conflicts

STRATEGY	Win One MRC	Win One MRC with Hold in Second	Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs	Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs Plus Conduct Smaller Operation
Army Force Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 Active Divisions • 6 Reserve Division Equivalents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 Active Divisions • 6 Reserve Division Equivalents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 Active Divisions • 15 Reserve Enhanced-Readiness Brigades 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 Active Divisions • 8 Reserve Enhanced Equivalents

Source: BUR, Oct 1993

The eight-division force proved capable of executing one MRC and peacekeeping operation simultaneously, or one conflict posing demands that substantially exceeded those of a nominal MRC.

The ten-division force, when complemented by a series of critical enhancements, proved capable of executing one MRC and large-scale peacekeeping operation simultaneously, or two nominal MRCs occurring nearly simultaneously.

The twelve-division force proved capable of executing two nominal MRCs and peacekeeping operations nearly simultaneously or one nominal MRC and one posing demands that exceed a nominal MRC, nearly simultaneously.

The ten-division force, with a number of critical enhancements, was selected as the prudent force level for the Army for the following reasons:

The two-MRC situation, although the most stressing situation, was viewed as relatively unlikely; one MRC and a peace operation were considered much more likely, given the present strategic environment.

The risk that the United States might one day have to terminate peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in order to constitute forces for a potential second MRC was deemed to be modest and acceptable.

By enhancing the readiness of fifteen of the Army National Guard brigades, the planned force structure should be able to cope with adverse circumstances that might pose demands for substantially larger numbers of ground force combat formations than those planned in the Active Component.

Enhanced Brigades

Purposes and Missions

- Provide Strategic Hedge Against Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRC).
- Reinforce or Augment Active Component (AC) Forces Deployed to an MRC.
- Backfill AC Overseas Presence or Peace Operations when AC Forces Committed Out of Theater.
- Potential Force for Lesser Regional Conflict.

- Capable of Rotational Missions when Protracted AC Deployment to an MRC Requires Relief of Committed Forces.
- Gives Strategic Depth to Forces
- Principal RC Ground Component Maneuver Forces.
 - ◆ Seven Heavy and Seven Light Brigades, One ACR.
- "Enhanced" With Increased Resources and Manning Priorities with Improved Pre-Mobilization Training Strategies.
 - ◆ Combat Units Achieve Platoon Proficiencies.
 - ◆ CS/CSS Units Achieve Company Proficiency.
- Resourced to be Ready to Deploy at C-1 within 90 Days after Call Up.
- Doctrinally Employable, C3I-Compatible, Logistically Supportable by any Corps or Division.

Other enhancements to the planned force, including increased strategic mobility, greater lethality from advanced munitions, and more effective battlefield surveillance and command and control capabilities, would ensure that our forces can get to the fight more quickly and win more decisively when they are employed.³³

The MRC Building Block Concept

The Bottom-Up Review detailed analysis determined that future MRCs will normally require the following "building block" structuring of US forces. These components constitute a prudent building block for force planning purposes. In the event of an actual conflict, the forces deployed would be tailored according to the nature and scale of the aggression and to circumstances elsewhere in the world.

Table 12.0 Forces Planned for a Major Regional Conflict
(MRC) (Nominal Case)

- 4-5 Army divisions
- 4-5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades
- 10 Air Force fighter wings
- 100 Air Force heavy bombers
- 4-5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups
- Special operations forces

Source: BUR, Oct 1993

The BUR postulated that in most cases four to five Army divisions, fighting in concert with the forces of regional allies, would be sufficient to ensure US and allied victory in a war against a regional adversary. The BUR also recognized that victory in any future MRC would result from the synergy achieved through joint and combined warfighting.³⁴

Estimating the size and nature of future conflicts is subject to unavoidable uncertainties. It is especially important to account for the ability of regional states to deploy larger and more powerful ground forces than anticipated. Such forces are more affordable than air forces and navies; they are manpower intensive; and they can be used for internal security purposes--features that make them attractive to potential adversary states in the developing world. We must have plans to provide additional divisions to a specific MRC that might require more forces than the nominal case.

The BUR concluded that one or two Army divisions beyond those provided in our basic building block would be sufficient to cope with "worst case" scenarios involving regional adversaries. Therefore, should two MRCs pose "worst case" conditions, it might be possible that a total of twelve to fourteen Army divisions could be called for. Although such an eventuality is deemed extremely unlikely, the fifteen Army National Guard enhanced readiness brigades, which equate to five division "equivalents," serve as the hedge against such situations.³⁵

If a single MRC arises that requires seven divisions (i.e., an adverse case), seven Active divisions, or possibly six Active divisions and three enhanced readiness National Guard brigades, would respond, leaving three to four Active divisions immediately available for a second MRC. In such a situation, to posture the force for a possible second MRC, the National Command Authority would have to rely upon a timely call-up of other Army National Guard enhanced readiness combat brigades to help reconstitute a second five-division MRC force. In such circumstances, we would almost certainly pull U.S. forces out of any ongoing peace operation and prepare them for possible commitment to a second MRC.

In any MRC, Reserve forces will play an absolutely essential role from the outset, especially in combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). Although our analysis concluded that Reserve combat maneuver forces would not be needed to fight and win two nominal MRCs occurring nearly simultaneously, that would clearly not be the case with Reserve CS and CSS forces. In a two-MRC scenario, for example, assuming the first MRC occurs in SWA followed by a second MRC in Korea, Reserve CS and CSS forces would total approximately 136,000 soldiers, or 60% of the total CS/CSS forces for the first MRC, and close to 138,000 soldiers, or approximately 80% of the total CS/CSS forces for the second MRC.

In summary, the Bottom-Up Review determined that ten Active Army divisions were adequate to meet our force requirements for most foreseeable circumstances, but it also recognized that the nation must be ready to meet the unexpected. The enhanced readiness brigades in the Army's Reserve Component serve as the hedge to meet unforeseen force shortfalls. At the outside, fourteen divisions would be required for two MRCs; the Bottom-Up Review provided for a total force of fifteen division "equivalents," thereby adding an additional hedge.

APPENDIX C

FORCE GENERATION MODEL

Army Projection Capability:

The concept of a projection Army depends on its ability to deploy the necessary forces and equipment from home bases rapidly enough to meet potential mission requirements. The key to this is strategic mobility.

Those missions that must be anticipated are framed in the Bottom-Up Review's concept of two major regional conflicts, along with the recommendations of the most recent Mobility Requirements Study.

For the Army, projection objectives are based on the first and most demanding contingency scenario, the one that would require a corps of up to five divisions. Most pressing is the timing and sequence needed to ensure stopping the enemy and permitting a rapid military buildup, in that order. This scenario would place a lead brigade on the ground by C+4 days, a lead division by C+12, two armored or mechanized divisions from the continental United States by C+30, and a five-division corps with a corps support command (COSCOM) in place by C+75, along with sufficient supplies to sustain the force until the regular lines of communication are working.

Table 13.0: Force Support Packages I

FORCE SUPPORT PACKAGES I

- Designed to Provide a Power Projection Capability by Packaging CS and CSS Units to Support:
 - 5 1/3 CONUS Divisions, 2 Corps, and 1 Theater
- Highest Priority Non-Divisional Units




Table 14.0: Force Support Packages II

Force Support Packages II

UNITS

- 543 units are currently in FSP I & 552 in FSP 2
 - 88 additional units currently unresourced.
- 50% are RC units: 33% in USAR; 17% in ARNG.
- RC Capabilities include:
 - 6 FA Brigades (19 Bn) and 1 ADA Brigade (2 Bn)
 - 5 Attach, 5 EAD Avn, 1 Air Ambulance Bns
 - 1 Bn Cmd, 3 En Bdes, and 36 Bns
 - 1 Sig Bde and 7 Sig Bns
 - 1 MP Bde and 7 MP Bns
 - 1 Chem Bde (3 Bns)
 - 2 Med Bde (5 Cbt Spt Hospitals)
 - 1 ASG, 5 CS Bns, 1 Ammo, 4 Pet, 4 TC, 1 Bn
 - TAACOM w/PERSCOM and Trans Cmd



PERSONNEL

- 152.6K Personnel are in FSP 1 & 2 units.
- 52% are RC units:
 - 26% in USAR
 - 26% in ARNG



APPENDIX D

DEFINITIONS OF PEACEKEEPING TERMS AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

Emerging joint doctrine defines peacekeeping operations (PKO) as:

military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.³⁶

The term "peace operation" (PO) is further broken down into its component derivatives in the Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations as follows:

Peace Operations: Encompasses peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace enforcement operations (PEO), and other military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Peace Enforcement: Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Peacemaking: Process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.

Peace Building: Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.³⁷

No peacekeeping operation should be mounted without a "clear mandate." This mandate authorizes the peacekeeping forces' presence and activities. It describes the scope of operations, including constraints and restrictions. The mandate should express the political objective and international support for the operation and define the desired end state. Effective peacekeeping mandates should contain the following specific terms of reference (TOR):

- (1) A clear mission statement (includes end state)
- (2) The size of the force.
- (3) The contributing nations, forces, and support.
- (4) Limitations on the duration of the operation.
- (5) Rights and immunities of the force.
- (6) Rules of engagement (ROE)
- (7) Force protection
- (8) Appointment of the Force Commander
- (9) Financing
- (10) Relationships of belligerent parties
- (11) Limitations of a geographical nature.³⁸

Appendix E

Table 15.0: Participation in Selected Peace Operations

Operation	Time Period	Country or Region	Mission	Approximate maximum number of forces
Multinational Force and Observers	1982 - present	Sinai	Sinai buffer force between Egypt and Israel	1,100
Provide Comfort	1991 - present	Northern Iraq	Provide safe havens for population of northern Iraq	1,500
Provide Relief/Restore Hope/Continue Hope	1992-1994	Somalia	Provide security and support for relief efforts	26,000
Provide Promise	1992-present	Bosnia	Provide humanitarian assistance	1,000
Deny Flight	1992 - present	Bosnia	Support U.N. no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina	2,000
Southern Watch	1992 - present	Southern Iraq	Monitor repression of southern Iraq population	14,000
Sharp Guard	1993 - present	Adriatic Sea	Prevent arms from entering the former Yugoslavia	11,700
Uphold Democracy	1994 - present	Haiti	Secure conditions for the return of democracy	20,000
Source: GAO/NSAID 95-51				
Bosnia Operation Joint Endeavor	Dec 1995 - present	Bosnia	Restore/Stabilize peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina	20,000+

Source: USA Today
12/29/95 - 1/1/96

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APPENDIX F

Table 16.0:

TITLE 10 USC MOBILIZATION STATUTES

12301(a) Full Mobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Requires declaration of War or National Emergency by the Congress• Requires Congress in Session	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• All Reservists including members in an inactive status and retired members• No number limitation stated• Duration of War or Emergency + 6 months
12302 Partial Mobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Requires declaration of National Emergency	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ready Reserve• Not more than 1,000,000• 2 year duration
12304 Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Requires Presidential notification of Congress• No Declaration of National Emergency	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Only Selected Reserve (No IRR)• Not more than 200,000• 270 days
12301(b) 15-day Statute	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Service Secretaries may call Selected Reserve up to 15 days• Active Duty for Training under Section 270 may impinge	
12301(d) RC Volunteers	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Requires consent of individual RC members• Governors must consent to Guard activation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• All Reservists• No number limitation stated• No duration stated

Source: Title 10 USC, Active Duty, p. 1618


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APPENDIX G

The Army's projected end strength for Fiscal Years 1995 through 1999 are as follows:

Table 17.0:

Army's Projected End Strengths for Fiscal Years 1995-1999



Source: HQDA OCAR-DAAR-ORFD

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NOTES

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²Stephen John Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling Preventive Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995).

³Arthur H. Barber III, "Engagement through Deployment: Shaping America's Future Military," Parameters 24, no. 4 (Winter 1994-95), 20-21.

⁴United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), 3.

⁵International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 22.

⁶The White House, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), 4.

⁷The White House, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington: US Government Printing Office, February 1995), 2.

⁸Army Budget Fiscal Year 1996, An Analysis, Association of the United States Army, May 1995, 19.

⁹General Accounting Office, Peace Operations, Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United States (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, May 1995), 17.

¹⁰Ibid., 2-3.

¹¹Department of the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, The Army Budget, 1996/1997 President's Budget (Washington: US Government Printing Office, April 1995), 2.

¹²Bernard Adelsberg, "Troop Budget Needs Fixing", Army Times 19 (4 December 1995): 3.

¹³The Effect of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness, Interim Report, June 1995, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned), 4.

¹⁴Ibid., 4-5.

¹⁵Ibid., 5-9.

¹⁶General Accounting Office, Peace Operations, Heavy use of Key Capabilities May Effect Response to Regional (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1995), 4.

¹⁷Ibid., 20.

¹⁸Ibid., 5.

¹⁹Ibid., 22.

²⁰Ibid., 51.

²¹Ibid., 50-51.

²²Armed Forces, U.S. Code Title 10, sec. 12304.

²³"Changes in the Army Reserve," Army Reserve Magazine 41, no. 2 (Fall 1995), 18-21

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵The White House, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington: US Government Printing Office, February 1996), 22.

²⁶National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Washington: Department of Defense, 1995), i.

²⁷Ibid., 2.

²⁸Ibid., 4.

²⁹Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (Washington: Department of Defense, October 1993), 7.

³⁰Ibid., 13.

³¹Ibid., 14-15.

³²Ibid., 23.

³³Ibid., 29-31.

³⁴Ibid., 18-19.

³⁵Ibid., 19.

³⁶The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War. Joint Pub 3-07, Draft, (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, undated), III-12.

³⁷Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Washington: Joint Warfighting Center, February 1995), Ex-1.

³⁸Department of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, December 1994), 15.

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